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I. Introduction 
The futures of the United States and Japan are today and 
forever more linked. It's a fact of life. It's never been 
clearer or truer than it is today. And it affords one of the 
most exciting opportunities and challenges for both of our 
countries. 
That is why I am delighted to be with you today and grateful 
for the kind invitation to share with you some of my thoughts on 
a topic that has certainly preoccupied many of us in this room 
for some time. More to the point, this evening gives me the 
chance to take stock with you on where our relations, 
particularly in trade and economics, sit at the moment and where 
they may lead at a when George Bush is about to be sworn in as 
our nation's 41st president. 
But as we face what is a difficult period of adjustment, 
there is nothing more certain than the depth and breadth of the 
U.S.-Japan relationship. Whether we are sitting across from one 
another at the negotiating table or not, we can always draw on a 
reservoir that has grown rich over forty years. There is no 
bilateral relationship quite like ours, and there will never be 
one quite like it again. 
We stand today as world leaders. We share an economic 
maturity and stability that few others can hope to match. But in 
this strength comes responsibility. The world is watching as the 
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two great powers grapple with one another. 
In the aftermath of the U.S. election, I believe both of our 
countries can take great comfort. Seasoned players who are tough 
but pragmatic and who have shown political savvy in the past will 
take center stage, and that is all for the good. 
II. An Historical Perspective 
Let's step back for a moment and put all of this in 
perspective. 
No understanding of what the United States and Japan face 
today is complete without coming to grips with the world as it 
existed just after the second world war. It is a history lesson 
that we cannot easily forget. 
For the United States it was an unsettling period. Faced by 
a world literally torn apart, we quickly became the major 
political, economic, and military center of the globe — not by 
choice, but by necessity. 
General Douglas MacArthur, on behalf of the United States, 
took an unprecedented role in leading and working constructively 
with Japan to revitalize its shattered country, economy, and 
self-worth. What a tale it is today to hear Commerce Secretary 
William Verity reminisce about how his grandfather, the founder 
of Armco Steel, received the first stock certificate from Nippon 
Steel after he spent several years leading major support for the 
post World War II reconstruction of the Japanese steel industry. 
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For Europe, the Marshall Plan became the cornerstone of 
America's determination to help rebuild an entire continent. In 
retrospect, it is an incredible irony to listen to Vernon 
Walters, our Ambassador to the United Nations, speak of the days 
when he saw the first shipment of machine tools delivered to 
Germany — a gift from the people of the United States. 
For the United States the end of the war meant that the 
overseas markets came to us. If a country needed a steel girder 
or a consumer product, the United States furnished almost all of 
the world's imported needs. Chief executive officers of 
America's top corporations faced their stockholders with their 
profits soaring. Good decisions, bad decisions — who knew what 
proper turns where being taken in the boardrooms during those 
heady days. 
But what a difference 40 years makes. Over time we saw the 
advent of the multinational corporation where even U.S. companies 
foreign sourced their assembly of products for export to the 
United States. We witnessed the protection of specific 
industries, beginning with textiles in the late 1950's and early 
1960's, through the complexity of a multi-fiber agreement. 
Finally, we watched the largest and richest marketplace in the 
world become the target of every country from East to West. For 
third world and industrialized world alike, the United States 
represented potential profit and economic growth. For Japan the 
U.S. market became the cornerstone of its export driven economy 
and growth for the future. 
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And for most of that 40 years the United States believed it 
was generally able to withstand the onslaught of increasing 
imports as well as — quite candidly — the barriers posed to us 
by a number of countries in accepting U.S. exports. We continued 
to maintain trade surpluses and our economic strength remained. 
But the advent of the 1970's brought with it a new reality -
-the reality that the United States could no longer remain the 
passive giant. Both in putting our house in order as well as in 
assuring a fair and open world marketplace, the questions of our 
own economic future came into focus as never before. 
How we are proceeding along that path has been the subject 
of one of the most intense debates in the United States? Truly, 
we are confronting a time and place we have never quite known 
before. 
Globalization and interdependence have made a critical 
difference in the way we deal with one another, and it is a trend 
that will never be reversed — no matter what any single interest 
or person would like. 
In fact, if you think about it, an American today can 
probably be defined as someone drinking Brazilian coffee from an 
English cup, who returning home in his German car from an Italian 
movie, sits in his Danish chair, picks up his Japanese ballpoint 
pen, and writes his congressman complaining about the trade 
deficit.  
But make no mistake, the pressure points in confronting this 
new era for the United States have been overwhelming, and it 
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cannot be overstated how doggedly persistent the Reagan 
administration has been in holding the line in the advance of 
protectionism. 
Right off the bat, the president inherited a government 
which already conceded that imports would surpass exports 
throughout the decade. By 1981 it became apparent that 
traditional surpluses enjoyed by the United States around the 
world were drying up and were being replaced by growing deficits. 
As we come to the end of the Reagan administration, it has 
become obvious even to the most casual observer that the United 
States has had to face some hard, cold, and at times even cruel 
realities during the past eight years. 
Gone are the days when the United States could withstand an 
overappreciated dollar as it did in 1984 and 1985. Gone are the 
days when the United States could stand as a lone buffer to the 
world and look the other way when countries provided industrial 
targeting of our domestic market and placed our own firms at a 
disadvantage in third country markets. Gone are the days when 
the United States could turn a deaf ear to its firms barred from 
freely competing in the markets of foreign countries when firms 
from those same countries were given unhampered access to the 
rich U.S. market. 
What a different time and place it is today. 
The convergence of all these forces, of course, has taken 
its toll. For the rest of this century the world will continue 
to watch the United States absorb itself in an examination of 
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conscience — an intense introspection on its future role in the 
trading world. And of course no country has helped to bring this 
message home better than Japan. 
Unlike Japan the United States has never truly developed an 
export culture. For most small to medium size businesses, the 
challenge has been exporting from Illinois to Indiana, and once 
that export market has been tapped, it's on to Ohio. When a 
business really wants to think "big", it starts to consider 
diversifying its product line. With a distribution system in the 
United States second to none, the road is simple. 
This dependence on the U.S. domestic market, however, is 
only part of our problem. Notwithstanding many fine U.S. 
companies which are the most competitive in the world, other U.S. 
exporting firms simply have not made the grade. Slow delivery, 
lack of information on suppliers, poor after-sales service, and 
difficulties in placing small orders have been criticisms leveled 
against them. Many of these concerns have been justified. 
A few years ago, the New York Times printed a passage from a 
newly declassified State Department memorandum, concerning a 
meeting of the National Security Council in 1954. According to 
the memo, then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reported 
that he had told Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida "Frankly Japan 
should not expect to find a big U.S. market because the Japanese 
don't make the things we want." The New York Times excerpt was 
titled "Famous Last Words." The moral of the story is — don't 
rule anything out. And I won't rule out the ability of American 
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business to compete now or ever. 
But understand, too, how the development of an export 
culture becomes inextricably linked to the foundations of 
establishing a proper trade infrastructure. I am talking about 
an infrastructure that infuses primary and secondary schools with 
basic quality education in science, mathematics, languages, and 
geography. I am talking about an infrastructure that addresses 
our over burdened airports that are the hub for trade. I am 
talking about an infrastructure that continues to reward 
independence and innovation through sufficient research and 
development over time. These are the challenges out there for 
US. For Japan, a reluctant bride on the world stage, these past 
few years have been as rocky as they have been for the United 
States. No structural adjustment around the globe has been more 
difficult to confront than for the Japanese government and the 
Japanese people to comprehend and accept fully the economic 
predominance they have in today's world. To turn off the spigot 
of protecting the domestic market or of having Tokyo target 
foreign markets for Japanese goods has been exceedingly 
difficult. It is a process that continues to torment but one 
that must take place. 
Nothing captures this adjustment or stands as a clearer 
milestone quite like the two Maekawa reports issued in 1986 and 
1987.  
The Maekawa reports of 1986 and 1987 were the products of an 
advisory committee to former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, 
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chaired by former Bank of Japan Governor Haruo Maekawa to provide 
useful guides for structural reform in Japan. 
The Maekawa reports recommended various measures to improve 
the Japanese standard of living. Such improvements, they argued, 
are needed not only to increase the welfare of Japanese citizens, 
but also to create the conditions for sustained increases in 
Japanese domestic demand and imports. Although continued 
economic growth in Japan and the appreciation of the yen since 
1985 have raised Japanese per capita GDP to over $20,000 (based 
on exchange rates for year end 1987) — compared to a figure of 
about $18,000 in the United States — Japanese per capita income 
is only about 80 percent of U.S. per capita income on a 
purchasing power parity basis. That is, if Japanese per capita 
incomes are adjusted for what Japanese consumers can actually 
buy, their incomes are effectively 20 percent lower than U.S. 
per capita incomes. 
The recommendations of the Maekawa reports addressed some of 
the obstacles to improving living standards in Japan and allowing 
Japanese consumers to increase their consumption of Japanese-made 
and imported products commensurate with the increased value of 
Japanese GNP. For example, the second Maekawa report strongly 
urged rapid reductions in the differential between Japanese and 
work market prices for agricultural products. 
One final, timely example of the change in Japan extends to 
the current tax overhaul that Prime Minister Takeshita is 
sheparding through the Diet; an attempt to make the system more 
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equitable and to foster stronger domestic growth. 
III. The Current State of Play 
For a moment now, let's look at the overall trade picture 
for our two countries. During the period January - September 
1988 U.S. global exports were up almost 30 percent over a year 
earlier while U.S. imports were about 10 percent higher. If 
these trends continue, the 1988 U.S. trade deficit will register 
$137.1 billion, down almost 20 percent from last year's $170,3 
billion deficit. Meanwhile, U.S. exports to Japan have increased 
almost 40 percent while U.S. imports from Japan are up less than 
five percent. At current rates, the U.S. deficit with Japan will 
decline by about $7 billion. 
Japan has also begun to reduce its foreign trade imbalance. 
It's yearly global trade surplus to date is about 20 percent 
lower than last year's comparable level. 
However, it is much too early to count our chickens: both 
the United States and Japan still face massive foreign trade 
imbalances. In 1987, Japanese exports were 75 percent larger 
than Japanese imports and the Japanese trade surplus was 
equivalent to 3.8 percent of GNP. In comparison, the U.S. trade 
deficit was equivalent to 3.8 percent of U.S. GNP in 1987. Even 
after the improvement so far this year in the U.S. trade deficit, 
U.S. imports still exceed U.S. exports by over 40 percent, so U.S 
exports much continue to grow substantially faster than U.S. 
imports to achieve further reductions in the U.S. trade deficit. 
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For this to occur, the United States and Japan must exert 
even greater efforts to achieve macroeconomic adjustment. 
Notwithstanding the U.S. and Japanese trade adjustments that have 
occurred, projections by the International Monetary Fund of 
continued external adjustment under current policies by the 
United States, Japan, and West Germany indicate that U.S. 
external liabilities and Japanese and West German external assets 
will continue to grow through 1992. Based on these projections, 
by 1989 U.S. net external debt will grow to the equivalent of 14 
percent of GNP, from 7.9 percent of GNP at year end 1987. 
Meanwhile, Japan's net assets will reach the equivalent of 16 
percent of GNP in 1989 (from 9.3 percent of GNP at year end 
1987) . 
If the accumulation of U.S. foreign debt — and the 
excessive growth of Japanese foreign assets — is to be slowed 
and eventually reversed, appropriate fiscal and monetary 
policies, reforms to remove structural rigidities, and programs 
to reduce protectionism and dismantle trade barriers must be 
implemented by the United States, Japan, and our mutual trading 
partners. 
IV. Tackling the U.S. Trade Front in the Bush Administration 
How, then, will the Bush Administration proceed towards its 
overall trade and economic policy?  
First, it is obvious that the next administration will be 
absorbed in the first few months of 1989 with implementing the 
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1200 page trade act; with executing the terms of the U.S.-Canada 
free trade arrangement; with the following through on the results 
of the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round in Montreal coming up 
in December; and with analyzing carefully all those directives 
coming out of Brussels in anticipation of the internalization of 
the European Community market. By 1992 the administration won't 
be wanting for things to do. 
In other areas I think the future is also clear. On the 
question of dollar, the President-Elect has already made clear 
that he views with great urgency the need to establish the 
dollar's credibility and stability, and that means giving some 
sense of direction on addressing the budget deficit in the early 
days of his administration. That statement alone has helped to 
calm jittery markets for the time being. 
In dealing with foreign unfair trading practices and even 
some if its own, the United States will continue to place a great 
deal of stock in the success of the Uruguay Round, recognizing 
that the multilateral approach to the international commerce of 
trade is the ideal approach. The current system needs to be 
fixed and the issues of agriculture, services, intellectual 
property rights and investment need to be covered. 
Many of us see international commerce as a fine tuned 
instrument that can either be strengthened or be seriously 
impaired by its players. Wholesale forfeiture of the basic rules 
of free and fair trade can only lead to a calamitous fall for all 
of us. The central role that the United States plays in that 
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setting cannot be forgotten. 
But until then and even after the conclusion of the Round, 
should proper and effective solutions not be found, I believe 
that the President will continue to rely upon his Section 3 01 
authority under the Trade Act of 1974 and as it was amended under 
the new trade law. Inasmuch as we have had experience with 
Section 3 01 over the past three years, I think it is clear that 
this tool will be used as a surgical instrument when necessary. 
Understand, though, that the new Trade Act of 1988 has 
placed greater pressures on the president to deal with the new 
Super 301 authority. Unlike existing 3 01 authority which targets 
sector or industry specific foreign trade barriers, super 3 01 is 
designed to combat generic or systematic trade practices employed 
by individual countries to restrict market access. 
We may at times disagree on what steps the U.S. government 
should take to see that U.S. firms are competitive overseas, but 
there is one element in which we are agreed: when a foreign 
government uses its industrial, economic, and governmental might 
to erect barriers or to use that machine to target foreign 
markets, it is not only the right but the imperative of the U.S. 
government to consider the implications and to act accordingly. 
If it determines that it is necessary to help broker an 
effective U.S. response, the administration will do so. Once the 
door is open and the rules of the game are clear and equitable to 
everyone, the time will come for us to step back. 
But again, I believe that the Bush administration will be 
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careful not to have an itchy trigger finger. It just won't bury 
its head in the sand either. 
Finally, we will see in a Bush administration greater 
attention focused on all elements of competitiveness, including 
trade promotion and the basic questions of how we solidify an 
infrastructure that will allow us to grow and accept more fully 
the challenges of being a trading nation. 
V. Dealing with Japan in the Bush administration 
In the midst of this picture what will the Bush 
Administration's approach be to Japan? 
First, there certainly will be every effort made to develop 
an articulate and cogent approach to our relations with our 
ally. Given Congress' mandate to have the executive branch lay 
out its trade policy program, it's obvious that at the very least 
the Bush administration will need to put pen to paper on the 
state of our country's trade relations with Japan. 
Furthermore, with James Baker at the State Department, we 
will have someone at the foreign policy helm who is experienced 
in dealing with the Japanese on the financial front from his 
former position as Secretary of the Treasury and on the trade 
front from his days as Chairman of the Economic Policy Council. 
Steady hands, however, will not preclude tough calls being 
made when it comes to questions of Japanese industrial targeting 
or market access. Comparative advantage designed and engineered 
by government technocrats is an anathema to the United States and 
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will be responded to accordingly. 
In particular, the Bush administration will strongly enforce 
this country's dumping laws and will keep a watchful eye on 
dumping in third markets, particularly when it comes to placing 
U.S. firms at a distinct pricing disadvantage. 
Also, watch carefully how the next administration handles 
the issue of tied aid credits; that form of financing that links 
the contribution of aid to the third world explicitly to the 
purchase of goods from the donor country. Japan has continued to 
offer this kind of export financing, mainly under guidelines 
established among the industrialized countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The 
question, however, is whether the United States should show even 
greater aggressiveness in assisting U.S. firms which face 
financially supported competition by their government. With the 
greater involvement of Japan in the development of the third 
world, the temptations to use tied aid credits as an anchor for 
market share will grow even stronger. A U.S. Export-Import Bank 
study on the issue, completed by January, will certainly provide 
a key to U.S. options for the future. 
The Bush Administration, of course, will find itself 
inheriting several discrete U.S.-Japan trade issues. If the 
Reagan administration does not lift the remaining sanctions on 
semiconductors, I fully expect the subject to be raised every  
time a bilateral trade meeting is held. The matter of market 
share v. volume sales will remain at the heart of the matter, but 
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I would find it inconceivable to see those sanctions lifted 
without genuine progress being made, supported by monthly U.S. 
export figures. 
Another concern that will not go away deals with the ability 
of U.S. construction firms to compete fairly for bids on Japanese 
projects, particularly the multi-billion dollar Kansai Airport. 
This spring the Bush administration will face the one year 
anniversary of the U.S.-Japan agreement on public works. 
As much as the new administration will need to continue to 
press the U.S. construction industry to shed its cynicism and 
aggressively bid for Japanese construction contracts, it will 
also be incumbent upon Japan to make every effort to open its 
market to first class U.S. construction firms. 
Also, look for greater interest on the part of the U.S. 
government to address broader market access issues such as 
penetrating the Japanese distribution system. Thanks to the 
efforts of MITI Minister Tamura and Commerce Secretary Verity the 
initiative of "Market Japan with America's Best" became a 
highlight of the past year. A presidential trade mission, which 
I joined and which was headed by the Secretary of Commerce, 
traveled to Tokyo in September with 25 business men and women. 
Those individuals represented the consumer good sectors of 
furniture, jewelry, processed foods, leisure goods, and sporting 
goods.  
The purpose of the trip was to educate and to penetrate one 
of the most cumbersome and costly distribution systems in the 
15 
world today. Here we are talking about an arcane and complex 
system that can add as much as 60 percent to the price of a 
Japanese product. As I found out quickly on that trip, an $8,000 
sofa at a department store is the norm. The trip was deemed a 
success, and other countries, interestingly enough, have followed 
suit. I would fully expect to see the Bush administration 
broaden that list of products and determine what future 
initiatives should be taken. 
On the agricultural front it is fair to say that we will 
take a breather early in the new administration after the success 
of U.S. efforts to sell beef and citrus to the Japanese market 
and after the decision by U.S. Trade Representative Clayton 
Yeutter not to proceed with a 301 on rice. But it is also clear 
that the pressure to have Japan join us at the GATT in tackling 
our mutual egregious subsidy practices and those of the rest of 
the world will be put to the test. And let's be realistic, rice 
will continue to hang in the background. 
One matter that will preoccupy the United States, however, 
will center around high technology as a whole. Over the past 
several years, we have watched our predominance in high 
technology goods slip world-wide, but it has been particularly 
the case with Japan. Market access and government subsidization 
will be watched very carefully. High definition television, 
supercomputers, telecommunications: all will be subjects fully 
addressed over the next year. And questions of complete 
protection of intellectual property will linger on in the high 
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technology area as well. 
I would be remiss if I did not raise the issue of export 
controls on the Bush agenda. The Toshiba case, in which the 
Toshiba Corporation of Japan and the Kongsburg Corporation of 
Norway were found guilty of passing along to the Soviet Union the 
most highly classified information and equipment to advance their 
arcane submarine fleet to greater parity with the West, was a sad 
chapter for all of us. But I must stress that it did provide the 
critical two by four which has brought us closer together in 
overseeing export controls and has permitted us to see a more 
cohesive and determined COCOM. This issue will continue to be 
critical for the Bush team. 
On another issue I will touch only briefly on investment, a 
subject that could be contained in its own lecture. But it 
certainly is apparent that the strength of our economy has 
produced an inward flow of Japanese investment into the United 
States at a record pace. In turn, that flow has allowed us to 
continue to grow at a time which the budget and trade deficits 
loom over us. 
There are voices that would have us discriminate in various 
forms against Japanese investment on the grounds that it is 
different, that its intention is devious, and that it is not in 
the long term interests of the United States to be so dependent 
on foreign capital from any one country. To the U.S. investor 
who set up international operations overseas in the 1950's and 
1960's, these echoes are familiar ones. Those were the days when 
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the United States was accused of unabashed hegemony and that our 
presence in overseas markets was somehow deluding the 
independence and economic freedoms of certain countries. 
For the Bush administration, like the Reagan administration 
and even the Carter administration before it, the president will 
clearly resist calls for restrictions, for formal registration, 
and for any measures that somehow place foreign investment on a 
totally different footing than other kinds of domestic 
investment. This freedom of investment flows has been a major 
tenet of our country's economic policy since World War II, and 
it has been a priority subject of ours in the Uruguay Round. 
With the complex and intricate disposition of the world's 
economic system and the future of our own economic health in the 
years to come, we can ill-afford tampering with this delicate 
balancing act. The cost of good intentions would be enormous. 
VI. Other Notions for Dealing with Our Trade Problem 
Let me also raise just a few of the numerous suggestions 
that have been offered to improve the process of trade disputes. 
One suggestion is to shift attention from means to ends: 
instead of pressing Japan to eliminate specific trade barriers 
and working out micro policies to allow U.S. firms to compete on 
equal terms with Japanese companies, the United States should 
simply insist on attaining a "fair" share of Japanese markets and 
leave it to Japan to find ways to assure this result. I would 
find this approach across the board to be very unlikely despite 
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some notions that have surfaced in recent academic debate. 
Another suggestion is to negotiate a free trade agreement 
between the United States and Japan. Proponents of this idea 
believe that a U.S.-Japan FTA could go well beyond a traditional 
FTA to include domestic policies that adversely affect trade as 
well as mechanisms to allow more coherent, systematic, and 
regular means of resolving trade disputes. This notion is being 
studied on both sides of the Pacific right now, and I believe it 
is premature to place any kind of imprimatur on it. There are 
strong feelings on both sides of the equation in the executive 
branch. 
A third suggestion has been to establish a permanent "Blue 
Ribbon Commission" composed of four or five experienced 
individuals from each side, working as private experts rather 
that as government delegates. These kinds of commissions have 
been used in the past by Presidents Carter and Reagan, but these 
were temporary panels and consequently could not provide long-
term follow-through and guidance. The proposed commission would 
meet regularly and frequently and direct a permanent staff to get 
the facts and recommend fair solutions. Under this scenario, the 
Japanese and U.S.governments would agree in advance to accept the 
findings of the commission and perhaps let it mediate some trade 
disputes. Again, the jury is out. 
That is what a great deal of the U.S.-Japan trade picture 
looks like to me. I probably should have titled my speech, "The 
United States and Japan: Competition, Cooperation, Continuity, 
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change, and challenge", but such indulgences in alliteration went 
out with Spiro Agnew. But it is true that all these words 
characterize different aspects of our relationship with Japan and 
will continue to do so in a Bush administration. 
Competition will spur U.S. and Japanese companies to 
innovate and commercialize products in many areas to the benefit 
of not only American and Japanese consumers but the world as a 
whole. This will be healthy so long as the competition is fairly 
based, and that's where cooperation comes into play. 
Cooperation between our nations ranges from joint ventures 
between U.S. and Japanese automakers which combine management and 
manufacturing techniques from both countries to the recently 
signed U.S.-Japan science and scientific research. It also calls 
on both of our countries to confront the hard realities of 
structural adjustment together. 
In turn, continuity marks our joint efforts to resolve trade 
problems and to enlarge the sphere of economic coordination 
between our two countries. It is a continuity based on an 
alliance that has been and will continue to be unbreakable. 
Change characterizes our relationship as we look back to the 
reestablishment of peaceful world trade after World War II, and 
change will become ever more prominent in our relationship with 
each other and with third countries as the pace of technological 
development and economic linkages continues to race ahead.  
Challenge is the earmark of our future. As the two largest 
economies of the free wold, the United States and Japan share the 
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responsibility of facing and surmounting a number of formidable 
challenges. We must work together to reduce our own foreign 
trade and financial imbalances and to encourage other countries 
to do likewise, without endangering world economic growth and 
stability. We must find ways to resolve the prospects of the 
poorest countries of Africa and Asia. We must cooperate in 
providing generous and disinterested assistance to the developing 
countries of South East Asia and in supporting the further 
development of the region. We must work together to ensure 
stability in world capital and financial markets. 
This I believe captures the Bush agenda in its relationship 
with Japan over the next few years. When it comes to the future 
of U.S.-Japan trade relations these days I feel as though I am in 
the middle of a good book. My biggest frustration is that I 
can't turn to the last page to see how it all turns out. All of 
us, however, realize all too well how much we need one another. 
We have a great deal of stake, and I'm not about to admit for one 
minute that we are not up to the adventure before us. Our 
biggest challenge will be to communicate and understand our 
relationship in the modern world more fully. As Goethe once 
said, "Nothing is more terrible than to see ignorance in 
action." We have got to make certain that misunderstandings and 
misperceptions do not lead to missteps. 
But being the optimist that I am, I am bullish on our  
future. I am bullish on our new president, and I am bullish on 
all the early signals that have emerged from Prime Minister 
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Takeshita's government. 
The only piece of advice that I would have for all of you in 
this room is to "stay tuned." 
